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BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court of Utah under Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3) (j), as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The State of Utah, through its Board of Education, and 
officers of the State of Utah in their official capacities are not 
persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Case No. 920204 
Category 16 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon a 
motion to dismiss, and the material facts are not in dispute* 
Because this issue raises only questions of law, the Court should 
give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a 
correctness standard. City of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 796 
P.2d 697 (Utah 1990). 
2. Plaintiff is without standing to sue for further 
injunctive or declaratory relief. 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
3. Plaintiff's state law claims were properly dismissed for 
failure to comply with the Notice of Claim requirement of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
4. A Bivens action cannot be brought against state agencies, 
employees, or officers. 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
5. Plaintiff's civil rights action is barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
6. Plaintiff's new causes of action against the individual 
defendants do not relate back to the original complaint against the 
State Board of Education. 
2 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
7. The individual defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity in that their actions did not violate any clearly 
established constitutional rights of the plaintiff. 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-7-11K2) (1988): 
If an individual fails to request a hearing 
within 30 days after written notice is sent to 
the last known address and to the address 
shown on the records of the commission, the 
commission may take action against the 
certificate holder under this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1989): 
A Claim against the state, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the attorney general and the agency 
concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any 
extension of time granted under Section 63-30-
11, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was originally a petition for judicial review of 
administrative action and complaint for damages filed on March 20, 
1989, by the plaintiff, Gregory T. Ambus, against the Utah State 
Board of Education. R. 1-11. The damage claims were dismissed by 
the trial court on May 16, 1989, and the plaintiff was granted ten 
days in which to file an amended petition for judicial review. R. 
3 
178. 
On November 9, 1989, the trial court denied the plaintiff's 
motion for partial summary judgment. R. 257-258. On interlocutory 
appeal, this Court reversed and remanded this action to the trial 
court. Ambus v. Utah State Bd. of Educ. 800 P.2d 811 (Utah 1990). 
Pursuant to this Court's decision, the trial court granted 
plaintiff summary judgment against the Utah State Board of 
Education on November 26, 1990. R. 356-358. As part of that 
judgment, the trial court granted the plaintiff thirty days in 
which to file a further amended complaint. 
On December 26, 1990, the plaintiff filed his Second Amended 
Verified Petition for Judicial Review and Complaint. R. 370-385. 
In this new pleading, plaintiff sought to join some nineteen 
individual state officers as new defendants. Defendants moved to 
dismiss the action, which motion was granted. R. 490-492. 
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was also denied. R. 500. 
Plaintiff then took the instant appeal. R. 502-503. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
By way of a newspaper article, the Executive Secretary of the 
Professional Practices Commission learned about charges that a 
teacher, Gregory T. Ambus, had been distributing and selling 
controlled substances. R. 129-135. A complaint was filed before 
the Commission against Mr. Ambus and a copy of the complaint was 
mailed by certified mail to the last known address of the plaintiff 
and to the address for the plaintiff shown in the records of the 
Commission. R. 60-67, 129-135. A Notice of Hearing before the 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE OP UTAH AND THE UTAH STATE BOARD 
OP EDUCATION, AND THEIR OPFICERS IN THEIR 
'OFFICIAL CAPACITIES1 ARE NOT ' PERSONS' 
PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 SUCH AS CAN BE 
SUED IN STATE COURT 
The Second Amended Verified Petition for Judicial Review and 
Complaint alleges violations of the Plaintiff's civil rights and 
seeks recovery pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. It is clearly 
established law that neither the State of Utah and the Utah State 
Board of Education or their officers in their "official capacities" 
are "persons" pursuant to §1983 and cannot therefore be sued 
thereunder. 
In its most recent case# the United States Supreme Court made 
it abundantly clear that the several states cannot be sued under 
§1983 in state courts. In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police. 
109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989), the Court held that the State of Michigan 
and its department of state police could not be sued in Michigan 
State Court for civil rights violations. 
Our conclusion is further supported by our 
holdings that in enacting §1983, Congress did 
not intend to override well-established 
immunities or defenses under the common law. 
"One important assumption underlying the 
court's decisions in this area is that members 
of the 42nd Congress were familiar with 
common-law principles, including defenses 
previously recognized in ordinary tort 
litigation, and that they likely intended 
these common-law principles to obtain, absent 
specific provisions to the contrary." 
(Citations omitted). The doctrine of 
sovereign immunity was a familiar doctrine at 
common law. "The principle is elementary that 
a State cannot be sued in its own courts 
without its consent," It is an "established 
principle of jurisprudence" that the sovereign 
7 
cannot be sued in its own courts without its 
consent. We cannot conclude that §1983 was 
intended to disregard the well-established 
immunity of a State from being sued without 
its consent. 
109 S.Ct. at 2309-2310, citations omitted. The State of Utah has 
expressly declared that it does not waive its immunity as to civil 
rights claims. §63-30-10(1)(b) Utah Code Ann. 1953# as amended. 
Therefore, the State of Utah and the Utah State Board of Education 
were properly dismissed from this action as far as allegations of 
violations of Section 1983 are contained in the Plaintiff's Second 
Amended Verified Petition for Judicial Review and Complaint. 
The Court in Will also addressed the question of whether or 
not official capacity actions for damages could be maintained 
against state officials in state court pursuant to §1983. 
Obviously, state officials literally are 
persons. But a suit against a state official 
in his or her official capacity is not a suit 
against the official but rather is a suit 
against the official's office. As such, it is 
no different from a suit against the State 
itself. We see no reason to adopt a different 
rule in the present context, particularly when 
such a rule would allow petitioner to 
circumvent congressional intent by a mere 
pleading device. We hold that neither a State 
nor its officials acting in their official 
capacities are "persons11 under §1983. 
109 S.Ct. at 2311-2312, citations and footnote omitted. 
reason, the instant action, as far as it sought to 
individual defendants liable for damages in their 
capacities, was properly dismissed as well. 
Plaintiff erroneously states that the State of Utah, or its 
Board of Education, can be named a defendant in this action for the 
For this 
hold the 
official 
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action is any valid allegation that the Plaintiff has any personal 
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stake in the outcome of any further challenge to the actions of the 
defendants. 
In Citv of Los Angeles v. Lyons. 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660 
(1983), the Court addressed the issue of what is required to 
adequately allege standing to seek injunctive relief. Lyons 
involved claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against Los 
Angeles and its officers who used a 'choke hold' on the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief holding the use 
of a 'choke hold' pursuant to the policies of the Defendants was a 
violation of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court 
addressed the jurisdictional issue of standing for seeking 
declaratory relief or injunction under §1983, and found that the 
Plaintiffs must demonstrate a "personal stake 
in the outcome" in order to "assure that 
concrete adverseness which sharpens the 
presentation of issues" necessary for the 
proper resolution of constitutional questions. 
(Citation omitted.) Abstract injury is not 
enough. The plaintiff must show that he "has 
sustained or is immediately in danger of 
sustaining some direct injury: as the result 
of the challenged official conduct and the 
injury or threat of injury must be both "real 
and immediate," not "conjectural" or 
"hypothetical". (Citations omitted.) 
461 U.S. at 101-102, 103 S.Ct. at 1665. The Supreme Court went on 
to determine that the possibility that the Plaintiff might again 
have an encounter with the police of Los Angeles of such a nature 
that, by their procedures, they would again use a choke hold on the 
plaintiff was not the real and immediate danger necessary to confer 
standing. 
The same result should be reached in the instant action. 
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against defendants. There is no live controversy between the 
plaintiff and defendants. No current action of defendants 
threatens to cause the plaintiff any direct injury. The plaintiff 
could only speculate and hypothecate as to possible injury that 
might occur in the future under certain conjectural scenarios that 
might be imagined. 
Plaintiff incorrectly claims that his unresolved desire for 
attorneys fees states a valid claim for prospective relief. The 
question of attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is a 
collateral matter and is not part of the merits of an action. 
White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec, 455 U.S. 454, 102 
S.Ct. 1162 (1982). 
If a merits judgment is final and appealable 
prior to the entry of a fee award, then the 
remaining fee issue must be "collateral" to 
the decision on the merits. Conversely, the 
collateral character of the fee issue 
establishes that an outstanding fee question 
does not bar recognition of a merits judgment 
as "final" and "appealable." 
102 S.Ct. at 1167, n. 14. In Obin v. Dist. NO. 9 of Intern. Ass#n, 
Etc. , 651 F.2d 574 (10th Cir. 1981) the Court held that a claim for 
attorneys fees under Section 1988 states a collateral claim that is 
properly filed after a party has prevailed on the merits. The 
Court also pointed out the an award of attorneys fees is appealable 
separately. 
In Schroder v. Volcker. 864 F.2d 97, 99 (10th Cir. 1988), the 
Court explained that Section 1988 does not create an independent 
cause of action, but "simply defines procedures under which 
remedies may be sought in civil rights actions." 
12 
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT f UTAH CODE ANN. 
S 63-30-12 
lieLeuddiil. H ilr i nui m 1 a i in l 
Act applies to plaintiff's federal ci/;. rights claims. 
Il in I pi a in nl i f f " s Btat.e law -? • a vioic^ o n s of M I P 
Utah State Constitution) against detenaanus are s^.ecl 1 > II 
Utal- Governmental Immunity Act which provides .-: Code Ann. 
A claim against the state, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the Attorney General and the agency 
concerned within one year after the claim, 
arises . 
The statutory language above is clear and unambiguous. Where, 
I in, in-1 I if-' i" H s i mi in t 1 ir I t i o n ight aga :i in st: the £ and i t s 
employees, a condition precedent to br inging suit i s the tiling ot 
a fiJiTieiy notice of cla I in, wi th the State agency involved (Utah Stale 
B o a j ' i l f hkJhiK fin i ,111111 i in mi mi I mi in ill i f f t v v n l I i n i\\ i i n i i e y \ J e i i e t i i i II 
this is not done, suit, is barred, 
There i s no dispute but that nn notice of claim was timely 
I in II i 11 i in t; In ;i s mi I I i mi s. i n a m i n , a II II h i i l l i II i i i i i Il a i in1 i in • 
plaintiff were properJ dismissed. 
This Court has ruled oAA numerc ^casions that" full 
compliance with the requirements n* 3vernmental irnmu *-v 
Act; is essential to maintain a cause ot action thereunder 
Scarborough u*., "Liranite Schoo 1 District,, Il I1 \ 
1 3 
the Court addressed the statute that mandates the filing of a 
timely notice of claim when suing a political subdivision of the 
State of Utah. §63-30-13 Utah Code Ann. is virtually identical to 
§63-30-12. 
In dismissing an action against a School District where the 
notice of claim was not filed in a timely manner, the Court 
explained: 
The School District is a political subdivision 
of the state. Therefore it would normally be 
immune from suit; and the right to sue is an 
exception created by statute. We have 
consistently held that where a cause of action 
is based upon a statute, full compliance with 
its requirements is a condition precedent to 
the right to maintain a suit. 
Id. at 482. See also. Cornwall v. Larsen. 571 P.2d 925, 926 
(Utah 1977); Sears v. Southworth v. State. 563 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 
1977); Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 
1286 (1973). 
The basic rule governing such matters was laid down by this 
Court in Hamilton v. Salt Lake City. 99 Utah 362, 106 P.2d 1028 
(1940) . 
The right to recover damages is statutory, it 
can only be availed of when there has been 
compliance with the conditions upon which the 
right is conferred. Where a right is purely 
statutory and is granted upon conditions, one 
who seeks to enforce the right must by 
allegation and proof bring himself within the 
conditions. 
106 P.2d at 1030, (citations omitted) . This Court again 
stressed this rule in Gallegos v. Midvale Citv. 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 
P.2d 1335, 1336-1337 (1972) (footnotes omitted): 
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The DOCtrine of Sovereign immunity which won! d 
ordinarily protect the City from such a suit 
was part of the common law and thus part of 
the body of law which was assimilated into the 
law of this jurisdiction at statehood. The 
allowance of a claim against the city for 
injuries which may be suffered because of the 
n
. . . defective, unsafe, dangerous . 
condition of any street n is a 
statutorily created exception to the Doctrine 
of Sovereign Immunity. Inasmuch as the 
maintenance of such a cause of action derives 
from such statutory authority, a prerequisite 
thereto is meeting the conditions prescribed 
in the statute. A party seeking to obtain the 
benefit thereof should not be entitled to 
claim the favorable aspects which confer the 
rights, and disavow the conditions upon which 
the rights are predicated. 
Galleaos has been implicitly overruled on other grounds hy 
(Utah 1977) But, that dealt with whether or not the Lime a 
plaintiff is under a legal disability is counted as pari of the 
time 'ill Li "(•• ml („'" I riiiii, Nu sun lit q u e s l JIIIHII i.H p r e s e n t e d 
ii:i • .- . r.srar.i ac: ,; , and the defendants submit that this decision 
is BLiii goou . • to the necessity of full compliance with the 
requirements ^
 A Code Ann,, § foJ-iO 1"/ 
Applying these cases to the instant a c ; r defendants submit 
that plaintd ff has fai led 1 i • ni| Il | v 'i Hi p : ' i\ 
shortcoming deprived the trial euiiiil ^-xsdicti^ . >i 
plaintiff's state law claims aqainst the defendants 
IV. A BIVENS ACTION' CAMNOT BE BROUGHT A^ 
STATE AGENCIES, EMPLOYEES OR OFFICERS 
I II ill il In i iiidii v nilii'i I d H endatiill ti in il I i iiJHLdiil iii I n m i n 
o f f i c e r s a n d e m p l o y e e s of t h e S l a t e of (Jtiiilh T h e o n l y ni In i 
defendant in this action is the Utah State Boar d of Education INi > 
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defendant is a federal officer or employee. 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur, of Narc. 403 
U.S. 388# 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), created a federal cause of action 
for damages against a federal officer who violates an individual's 
constitutional rights. At no time did Bivens create any cause of 
action against state officers or employees. 
Indeed, not all federal officers are susceptible to Bivens 
actions. In Chappell v. Wallace. 462 U.S. 296# 103 S.Ct. 2362 
(1983), the Court refused to create a Bivens action for enlisted 
military personnel against their superior officers. In reaching 
this decision, the Court explained: 
This Court's holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 
supra, authorized a suit for damages against 
federal officials whose actions violate an 
individual's constitutional rights, even 
though Congress had not expressly authorized 
such suits. The Court, in Bivens and its 
progeny, has expressly cautioned, however, 
that such a remedy will not be available when 
"special factors counselling hesitation" are 
present. 
462 U.S. at 298. In Romero v. Peterson. 930 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 
1991) the plaintiff filed a Bivens action against two tribal law 
enforcement officers. In vacating the trial court's denial of the 
defendants motion to dismiss, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
explained that "to state a Bivens action, plaintiff must allege 
circumstances sufficient to characterize defendants as federal 
actors." 930 F.2d at 1506. 
At no time has Mr. Ambus alleged that the defendants are 
federal officers, employees, or actors. Because these defendants 
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federal rictnrH -i Bivens type act: ::>n does not lie. 
V. PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 42 U.S.C. 
51983 AGAINST THESE UTAH STATE DEFENDANTS IS 
BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE "! 
LIMITATIONS 
The instant action, HH il relates lo the individual 
del eiinidiiLs, cinnrn our nir cnnrmrM nrrur ir i inj in rue friii HIM HIIIIIIIII i 
of l^ BH Tho Plaintiff's Second Amended Verified Petition for 
Judicial Review and Complaint was filpd nn December 26, IQ'-H") 
Plaintiff y latest amended compll d i ill in m much an n t .ill I 
civil rights violations, is barred by the* appropriate statute <M: 
I nn it .it; ions MM IViip I HI I i-'i ..it' ni> sots InrLh the express statute of 
limitations which should be applicable in a civ.il iigiili:. aiJ, ,i i m. 
Hul. the Tenth Circuit fourf ot Appeals held in Mismash v. Murray 
Cit \ n T II F , n 11 1 \ ( I" 1 1 1 1 1 I i ' i I ' 111 '1 I t hi in t ii n 111 ' i hi I 11o a p i ) i n p r 
statute of limitations as of that yeai , HB4, was foui; years. 
Because Congress has not enacted a statute of 
limitations expressly applicable to section 
1983 claims, the court must adopt the most 
analogous limitations period provided by state 
law. (Citations omitted,,) In Garcia v. 
Wilson. 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984) (en 
banc), decided this day, we considered the 
method by which an appropriate state statute 
is to be selected for section 1983 claims 
should be characterized as actions for injury 
to the rights of another. See id. a t 650-51. 
No Utah statute of limitations is expressly 
applicable to actions for injury to the rights 
of another. Under Utah law, personal torts 
other than those set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-29(4) (1953) are governed by the four 
year statute of limitations which applies to 
n
 [a]n action for relief not otherwise provided 
for by law," id. § 78-12-25. (Citation 
omitted.) Accordingly we conclude that all 
section, 1:983 claims brought in federal court 
in Utah are subject to the four-year 
limitations period provided in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-25. 
Mismash. 730 F.2d at 1367. The four year statute of limitations 
thus established has since been altered by action of the Utah State 
Legislature. In responding to the Tenth Circuit's decision in 
Mismash. the Legislature enacted an expressly applicable statute of 
limitations for civil rights actions. §78-12-28(3) Utah Code Ann. 
1953, sets a two year statute of limitations for "injury to the 
personal rights of another as a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 
1983." 
The instant civil rights complaint was not filed until over 
two years after the complained of actions took place. For this 
reason the instant action is barred by the statute of limitations. 
Utah has not sought to improperly restrict the time within 
which to bring a civil rights action. The legislature reached a 
compromise between the various possible time frames and that 
compromise was two years. While shorter than the four year 
statute, it still provides adequate time for a civil rights action 
to be brought. It gives the civil rights plaintiff twice the time 
for filing a complaint as the same plaintiff would have to file the 
necessary notice of claim against a governmental entity for a tort 
claim. 
VI. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE 
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS DO NOT RELATE BACK TO 
PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST THE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION 
Plaintiff's original complaint named only the Board of 
Education, a state agency, as a defendant. Because the State of 
Utah cannot be sued for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, no 
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v a l i d c la im of a c i v i l r i gh t s a c t i o n was be fore the cour4- uv^zZ 
DecpinhPi ?i'iir I "'iMIin 'iin t r i a l uuit c -rr — l" dismissed ar- —' 
iiglit.s cilaiiits in tin orig-.^-1 comp.« I ILMII"! t i e 
jurisdiction of the Court , 
I Uoxey Lay ion Company .-,.,. i I " 11. 111 f ri 11 1 9 7 6 I , 
this Court explained the * *.*• concerning relation back nit 
pleadings. 
Generally, Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will not 
apply to an amendment which substitutes or 
adds new parties for those brought before the 
court by the original pleadings - whether 
plaintiff or defendant. This is for the 
reason that such would amount to the assertion 
of a new cause of action, and if such were 
allowed to relate back to the filing of the 
complaint, the purpose a statute of limitation 
woul d be defeated, 
_;i .1 > II ii exception to this ruin is when there Is 
ider er est 1:: et I he n ,19 mini I \ art ies and I Mr 11 w 
parties, In Doxey that identity of 1 ml" i:,i est was found when t h e 
heirs to the named defendants were joined in the stead of the 
iiecedaenJl clef end at its 
In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co,, 681 P.2d 214, 23 7 
(Utah 19 84) t; h 1 s Court explained identity of i interest to me a 1:1 • 
operations that notice of the action against one serves to prov i de 
noi" i PP 1 il  1 Ii 1 1 in nil t :: the oth er ' Perry held that prd • i t] nil' 
contract: (between a purchaser of materia 1 and the suppli er and 
manufacturer ) was insufficient for identity of interest to be 
• 
In Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York. "': ~ ~1 --- —-1-
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App. 1988) , the Court of Appeals rejected an attempt to have an 
amended complaint relate back as it named a new defendant. The 
court relied, in part, on the test set down by the United States 
Supreme Court in Schiavone v. Fortune. 477 U.S. 21
 # 106 S.Ct. 2379 
(1986). 
Relation back is dependent upon four factors, 
all of which must be satisfied: (1) the basic 
claim must have arisen out of the conduct set 
forth in the original pleading; (2) the party 
to be brought in must have received such 
notice that it will not be prejudiced in 
maintaining its defense; (3) that party must 
or should have known that, but for a mistake 
concerning identity, the action would have 
been brought against it; and (4) the second 
and third requirements must have been 
fulfilled within the prescribed limitations 
period. 
477 U.S. at 29-30. Plaintiff, under the Schiavone test, has not 
shown that there was any mistake that caused him to fail to name 
the individual employees and officers until after the statute of 
limitations had passed. Indeed, no such mistake could be shown. 
Plaintiff originally filed this action against the Utah State Board 
of Education. Only after prevailing on his claims for judicial 
review of the administrative action did the plaintiff seek to amend 
the action so as to state civil rights claims against state 
officers and employees. 
The actions against the individual officers of the state are 
new causes of action that were not raised in the original 
complaint. They do not simply correct an error in the original 
complaint, but seek to fundamentally alter the lawsuit at an 
advanced stage of the litigation. If plaintiff sought only to 
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correct the error that the State of Utah can not be sued for 
violations of civil rights, he could have done so after the trial 
court's decision of May 16, 1989. (R. 178.) 
VII. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY UNDER THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN 
HARLOW V. FITZGERALD. 
During the past decade, the United States Supreme Court has 
emphasized the important role played by qualified immunity in 
disposing of civil rights claims against state and federal 
officials before trial. Recognizing that litigation against state 
officials under §1983 poses a significant risk of deterring public 
officers from the proper discharge of their official duties, the 
Supreme Court has provided qualified immunity to state officials. 
Thus, "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known," governmental officials are 
shielded from liability for civil actions for damages. Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Davis v. Scherer. 468 U.S. 
183, 191 (1984). The Supreme Court has described the justification 
for the qualified immunity defense as follows: 
Where an official could be expected to know 
that certain conduct would violate statutory 
or constitutional rights, he should be made to 
hesitate: and a person who suffers injury 
caused by such conduct may have a cause of 
action. But where an official's duties 
legitimately require action in which clearly 
established rights are not implicated, the 
public interest may be better served by action 
taken "with independence and without fear of 
consequences." 
457 U.S. at 819, citations omitted. The test set forth in Harlow 
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has come to be known as a test of "objective legal reasonableness.11 
See also, Anderson v. Creiahton. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
In Anderson, the United States Supreme Court rejected an 
attempt at defining broadly what rights have been "clearly 
established". The Court held that the mere existence of a clearly 
established broad and general right would not be sufficient to hold 
an officer liable. Explaining the clearly established law test of 
qualified immunity, the Court explained: 
The operation of this standard, however, 
depends substantially upon the level of 
generality at which the relevant "legal rule" 
is to be identified. For example, the right 
to due process of law is quite clearly 
established by the Due Process Clause, and 
thus there is a sense in which any action that 
violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it 
may be that the particular action is a 
violation) violates a clearly established 
right. Much the same could be said of any 
other constitutional or statutory violation. 
But if the test of "clearly established law" 
were to be applied at this level of 
generality, it would bear no relationship to 
the "objective legal reasonableness" that is 
the touchstone of Harlow. Plaintiffs would be 
able to convert the rule of qualified immunity 
that our cases plainly establish into a rule 
of virtually unqualified liability simply by 
alleging violation of extremely abstract 
rights. Harlow would be transformed from a 
guarantee of immunity into a rule of pleading. 
Such an approach, in sum, would destroy "the 
balance that our cases strike between the 
interests in vindication of citizens' 
constitutional rights and in public officials' 
effective performance of their duties," by 
making it impossible for officials "reasonably 
[to] anticipate when their conduct may give 
rise to liability for damages." Davis. supra 
at 195. [footnote omitted.] It should not be 
surprising, therefore, that our cases 
establish that the right the official is 
alleged to have violated must have been 
"clearly established" in a more 
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particularized, and hence more relevant, 
sense: The contours of the right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right. This is not to say that 
an official action is protected by qualified 
immunity unless the very action in question 
has previously been held unlawful, see 
Mitchell, supra. at 535, n. 12; but it is to 
say that in the light of pre-existing law the 
unlawfulness must be apparent. 
Id., at 639-640, emphasis added* Anderson makes clear that the 
objective reasonableness of an official's conduct does not turn on 
whether the conduct subsequently is found to be constitutionally 
suspect. That case involved a §1983 suit against a law enforcement 
officer who had conducted a warrantless search under the mistaken 
belief that probable cause existed. The Court held that the 
officer was entitled to qualified immunity because his belief in 
the lawfulness of his conduct had been reasonable. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hilliard v. City and 
County of Denver. 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1991) stated that it is 
the plaintiff who must show that the constitutional law he claims 
has been violated was clearly established. 
It is the plaintiff's burden to convince the 
court that the law was clearly established. 
In doing so, the plaintiff cannot simply 
identify a clearly established right in the 
abstract and allege that the defendant has 
violated it. Instead, the plaintiff "must 
demonstrate a substantial correspondence 
between the conduct in question and prior law 
allegedly establishing that the defendant's 
actions were clearly prohibited." While the 
plaintiff need not show that the specific 
action at issue has previously been held 
unlawful, the alleged unlawfulness must be 
"apparent" in light of preexisting law. The 
"contours of the right must be sufficiently 
clear that a reasonable official would 
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understand that what he is doing violates that 
right." If the plaintiff is unable to 
demonstrate that the law allegedly violated 
was clearly established, the plaintiff is not 
allowed to proceed with the suit. 
930 F.2d at 1518, citations omitted. In the instant action, 
the Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing that 
the Defendants violated any clearly established constitutional 
right of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff points to two actions by the defendants that he 
claims violated his rights. First, he points to the alleged 
failure of the defendants to give Mr. Ambus a pre-deprivation 
hearing. Second, Mr. Ambus states that his rights were violated by 
the use of the testimony from the arresting officer and the paid 
informant who had notice of the expungement and sealing of Mr. 
Ambus' criminal record. 
Mr. Ambus claims that he was denied a pre-deprivation hearing. 
This is not correct. When the defendants sought to notify Mr. 
Ambus of the complaint that was being filed, the certified letter 
was returned to the defendants as unclaimed. The same occurred 
when written notice of the hearing was sent. (R. 60-69.) In 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 53A-7-11K2) (1988) , the complaint 
and the notice were mailed to Mr. Ambus's last known address and 
the address shown on the records of the Professional Practices 
Commission. Both of these addresses were the same. (R. 60-69, 
130.) 
The question is not whether a pre-deprivation hearing was 
provided, but whether the defendants violated clearly established 
24 
law by sending the notice of the complaint and the hearing to the 
plaintiff by certified mail. This Court has addressed this issue 
recently in Anderson v. Public Service Commission. 190 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 24 (Utah 1992)
 # and Jensen v. Morgan. 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 
(Utah 1992). In both cases, this Court held that regular mailing 
when allowed by statute, as opposed to actual receipt, is 
sufficient notice. 
No right of the plaintiff was violated, let alone a clearly 
established right, by the mailing of the complaint and the notice 
of hearing to the only address that the Professional Practices 
Commission had for Mr. Ambus. While further search may, as 
plaintiff claims, have resulted in the Commission finding a valid 
address for Mr. Ambus, the Commission's failure to seek for a 
further address was not a violation of the clearly established 
rights of Mr. Ambus. The applicable statute was complied with. 
That is all that the prior cases of this Court requires. 
As to the second point raised by the plaintiff, concerning the 
use of the peace officer and informant's testimony, the fact that 
the defendants violated the statute concerning the expungement of 
records only became clear after the interlocutory appeal in this 
action and the intervening decision of this Court in Doe v. Utah 
Department of Public Safety. 782 P.2d 489 (Utah 1989). Defendants 
submit that reasonable officials can not be said to have known that 
the defendants actions violated clearly established law when the 
learned trial judge made the same error. 
This Court reversed and remanded a decision of the trial court 
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approving the use of this testimony. (R. 257-258.) Where the 
trial court erroneously concurred in the position of the laymen 
defendants, it can not be said that the law was so clearly 
established that reasonable defendants should have known their 
actions were wrong. 
This is especially true where this issue has been treated as 
one of statutory interpretation, and not as one of constitutionally 
mandated law. This Court has never stated that the rule of law in 
question is constitutionally required. The legislature of Utah is 
free to alter and amend the law in question. That the actions of 
the defendants, with perfect hindsight assisted by two new 
decisions from this Court, are now seen to have violated a state 
statute, does not show that any constitutional right has been 
violated. 
At the time of the actions taken by defendants, the 
constitutional law they are alleged to have violated was not 
clearly established and the defendants are therefore entitled to 
qualified immunity. 
Plaintiff seeks to avoid the proper application of the 
doctrine of qualified immunity to the defendants in this action by 
claiming that they were not performing a "discretionary function." 
Mr. Ambus has misunderstood the use of that language in the area of 
qualified, or good faith, immunity. The very cases cited by the 
plaintiff, demonstrate that qualified immunity is applicable to the 
defendants in this action. 
In Anderson, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that 
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qualified immunity was applicable to a federal law enforcement 
officer who performed a warrantless search. In Garcia by Garcia v. 
Miera. 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987), the Court considered whether 
school officials alleged to have inflicted excessive corporal 
punishment were entitled to qualified immunity. The Court did not 
find that their conduct was not a "discretionary function," but 
rather addressed the merits of whether or not the officials 
violated clearly established constitutional law. In Dixon v. 
Richer. 922 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1991), the Court considered that 
peace officers alleged to have used excessive force were entitled 
to assert qualified immunity, but in this particular case the Court 
found that the constitutional rights had been clearly established. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly dismissed this action. The State of 
Utah, and its Board of Education, cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. The individual state officers cannot be sued for damages in 
their official capacities. The plaintiff has already received the 
prospective relief to which he was entitled, and his further claim 
for prospective relief was properly dismissed. 
Plaintiff's state law claims were correctly dismissed because 
of the plaintiff's failure to file a timely notice of claim. 
Plaintiff's attempt at a Bivens action was properly dismissed 
because such an action does not lie against state officers, but 
only against federal officers. 
Plaintiff's civil rights action against the individual 
defendants was properly dismissed on the basis of the statute of 
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limitations, Ambus' second amended pleading could not relate back 
because it raised new issues and new defendants• Further, the 
individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ^f day of August, 1992 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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Commission set for May 20, 1988 was also sent by certified mail to 
the last known address of the plaintiff and to the address for the 
plaintiff shown in the records of the Commission. R. 60-67, 129-
135. Both of these certified letters were returned as 
undeliverable. 
On May 20, 1988, the plaintiff not appearing, the Commission 
recommended to the Utah State Board of Education that plaintiff's 
teaching certificate be suspended until such time as Mr. Ambus 
requested a hearing on the charges before the Commission. R. 68-
69. On August 19, 1988, the Utah State Board of Education formally 
revoked Mr. Ambus' teaching certificate. R. 71. 
On October 20, 1988, a hearing panel of the Utah State Board 
of Education heard evidence and argument as to whether or not the 
plaintiff's certificate should be reinstated. R. 114-127. The 
decision was to not reinstate the certificate. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah State Board of Education is not a 'person' as that 
term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and cannot therefore, be sued 
under that statute for any reason. The individual defendants, in 
their official capacities, cannot be sued for damages in a civil 
rights action because they are not 'persons' as that term is used. 
State officers, in their official capacities, can only be sued for 
prospective relief. Because the plaintiff, pursuant to this 
Court's ruling prior ruling, has already received all of the 
prospective relief to which he is entitled, plaintiff is without 
standing to sue for further injunctive or declaratory relief. A 
5 
claim for attorneys fees is not such further prospective relief, 
but is instead collateral claim for costs that can be brought after 
a decision on the merits has been entered. 
As to the plaintiff's state law claims, all such claims were 
properly dismissed because Mr. Ambus failed to comply with the 
notice of claim provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
A Bivens action is a judicially created claim against federal 
officers in certain circumstances. Such a claim does not lie 
against state officers or against the Utah State Board of 
Education. 
As to the plaintiff's civil rights damages claim against the 
individual defendants, this claim is barred by the appropriate two 
year statute of limitations. Because this claim is entirely 
different than the original complaint, and no mistake concerning 
identity misled the plaintiff, the second amended pleadings should 
not relate back to the time of the filing of the original action. 
Even if the individual defendants had been brought into this 
action in a timely manner, they were still properly dismissed on 
the basis of qualified immunity. The action of the defendants in 
relying on the address for plaintiff that was on file with the 
Professional Practices Commission to give the plaintiff notice was 
not a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. The 
fact that the defendants, and the trial court, misinterpreted the 
statute concerning expungement of records did not violate the 
clearly established constitutional rights of the plaintiff. 
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